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SESSION 2 - I

INTERNATIONAL PROCUREMENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 2016—PART I:
THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S POLICY OPTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
PROCUREMENT
Christopher R. Yukins
The George Washington University Law School
Washington, D.C.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The year 2016 saw a radical break from the free-market norms that have, to an increasing extent,
marked international procurement markets since World War II. In both the United Kingdom, with the
Brexit referendum (discussed in an accompanying piece by Michael Bowsher QC), and in the United States
with the election of Donald Trump, major electoral shifts meant that international trade in procurement
may well face new barriers in the coming years. See, e.g., Sue Arrowsmith, The Implications of Brexit for
Public Procurement Law and Policy in the United Kingdom, 2017 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 1; Christopher R.
Yukins, Brexit and Procurement: A U.S. Perspective on the Way Ahead, 2017 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 71 (available on Westlaw). At the same time, protectionism on the European continent may be on the rise (see
the accompanying piece by Dr. Pascal Friton, of Berlin), even as European states implements new EU
procurement directives intended to facilitate cross-border trade (see the accompanying piece from Andrea
Sundstrand, of Stockholm University).
The outlook for many international procurement markets is, in sum, grimmer than it has been in many
years, although this adversity may bring new hope for alternative means -- such as regulatory cooperation -- to reduce inefficient barriers to trade. See generally Christopher R. Yukins & Michael Bowsher QC,
Brexit and the Trump Election: Finding a Way Forward for Transnational Procurement, 2016 Eur. Proc.
& Pub. Priv. Part. L. Rev. 258 (available on Westlaw).
Part II of this piece will review the background to current developments in the United States. Part
III will discuss the U.S. elections and the Trump administration’s approach to international procurement,
Part IV will discuss some of the Trump administration’s policy options, and Part V will conclude by summarizing, in a rough matrix of costs and benefits, those options.
II.

BACKGROUND: FREE TRADE AND PROCUREMENT

In modern economics, the working presumption for centuries (at least since Adam Smith published
The Wealth of Nations in 1776) has been that open markets across borders achieve optimal domestic
welfare. That presumption drove U.S. policy after World War II, and led to U.S. support for what is today
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and a framework of international trade agreements that protect,
among other things, free trade in procurement. See U.S. Department of State, Suggested Charter for an
International Trade Organization of the United Nations Art. 9 (1946) (urging international trade arrangements to reduce barriers to procurement markets); Sue Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO
26-27 (2003); Christopher R. Yukins & Steven L. Schooner, Incrementalism: Eroding the Impediments to
a Global Public Procurement Market, 38 Geo. J. Int’l L. 529, 529 (2007); Robert D. Anderson & Sue Arrowsmith, The WTO Regime on Government Procurement: Past, Present and Future, in The WTO Regime
on Government Procurement: Challenge and Reform (Cambridge U. Press 2011); Sati Harutyunyan, Risk
and Expectation in Exclusion from Public Procurement: Understanding Market Access and Harmonization
Between the European Union and the United States, 45 Pub. Cont. L.J. 449 (2016).
In part as a result of those international agreements, which nurtured common legal norms as they
opened procurement markets in the covered nations, procurement systems around the world generally
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evolved along parallel tracks, adopting similar solutions to common problems.
While the United States, Canada and the European Union were leaders in
this evolution (see the accompanying piece from Brenda Swick, on Canada’s
recent progress), developing nations joined the fold as they agreed to enter
plurilateral free trade agreements (such as the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement (GPA)) and bilateral and regional free trade agreements
(which typically include chapters on procurement).
These parallel developments touched both procurement law and trade. As
channels of trade and communication opened, procurement regimes around the
world assimilated common best practices (such as methods of procurement) and
broadly accepted international norms (such as economic integration, sustainability, and anti-corruption). See, e.g., Sue Arrowsmith, The Implications of Brexit for
Public Procurement Law and Policy in the United Kingdom, 2017 Pub. Proc. L. Rev.
1, 2; Ijeoma Omambala & Nadia Motraghi, The Implications of Brexit for TUPE
in the Area of Public Procurement, 2017 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 62; Eleanor Fisher,
The Power of Purchase: Addressing Sustainability Through Public Procurement,
8 Eur. Pub. Proc. Pub. Priv. L. Rev. 2 (2013). The trade agreements thus facilitated international competition in procurement and advanced other goals, such
as respect for the rule of law. Disrupting the trade arrangements that underlie
these achievements could therefore have broader political, security, social and
legal effects, which could reach far beyond the procurement markets themselves.
III. PRESIDENT TRUMP AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
During and after the 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump made
it plain that while he considered himself a “free trader,” his administration
plans to renegotiate existing trade arrangements in order to further core
“Buy American” and “Hire American” policies. Candidate Trump criticized,
for example, “China’s disastrous entry into the World Trade Organization,”
and called for higher tariffs to protect U.S. industry. See Donald Trump, Declaring American Economic Independence, https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/
DJT_DeclaringAmericanEconomicIndependence.pdf.
Donald Trump also called for higher U.S. defense spending, including
increased spending on nuclear defense. At the same time, however, Trump
argued for reducing the costs of specific programs, including the Joint Strike
Fighter and Air Force One. E.g., Rowan Scarborough, Wash. Times, Jan. 4,
2017, Donald Trump Blasts Boeing, Lockheed Martin for Overpriced Weapons,
2017 WLNR 225822
After the election, President-elect Trump made his views on trade
even clearer. As part of a post-election victory rally in Florida, for example, President-elect Trump tweeted: “My Administration will follow two
simple rules: BUY AMERICAN and HIRE AMERICAN.” https://twitter.
com/realDonaldTrump/status/809969373754654721. At another rally, in
Iowa, Trump declared: “The American worker built this country and now
it’s time for American workers to have a government [that] for the first
time in decades answers to them.” See Daniella Diaz, Trump on Economy:
“Buy American, Hire American,” Cable News Network (CNN) (Dec. 8, 2016),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/08/politics/donald-trump-terry-branstadchina-des-moines-iowa-rally/.
In the new Administration, the new National Trade Council will be tasked
with implementing the Trump administration’s aggressive trade policies, including through procurement. See The Trump-Pence Transition Team, Press
© 2017 Thomson Reuters
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Release, President-Elect Donald J. Trump Appoints Dr. Peter Navarro to Head
the White House National Trade Council (Dec. 21,.2016) (“The mission of the
National Trade Council will be to advise the President on innovative strategies
in trade negotiations, coordinate with other agencies to assess U.S. manufacturing capabilities and the defense industrial base, and help match unemployed
American workers with new opportunities in the skilled manufacturing sector. The National Trade Council will also lead the Buy America, Hire America
program to ensure the President-elect’s promise is fulfilled in government
procurement and projects ranging from infrastructure to national defense.”)
IV. OPTIONS FOR TRUMP TRADE POLICY IN PROCUREMENT
The Trump administration will have several options to consider,
which carry different potential costs and benefits. Most of these options,
it should be noted, could be exercised without new legislation. The list of
options set forth here is not exhaustive, and it is possible that the Trump
administration will consider, and follow, other protective strategies in
procurement trade.
• Pressure Officials to “Buy American: Because imposing new
domestic preferences could run afoul of existing trade obligations (discussed
below), the simplest option might be for the Trump administration to admonish federal purchasers to “Buy American.” Given the flexibility inherent in
the competitive negotiations used for most significant federal procurement, it
would be relatively easy to mask a general domestic preference that was not
included in formal evaluation criteria. If it became clear that procurement
officials were regularly weighing an unstated preference in their evaluations,
however, foreign vendors might protest successfully that procurement officials
were unlawfully applying an ad hoc (and discriminatory) socioeconomic criterion, without explicit statutory or regulatory authority. See, e.g., John Cibinic,
Jr., Ralph C. Nash, Jr. & Christopher R. Yukins, Formation of Government
Contracts 1572 (4th ed. 2011) (“There is a view that collateral policies can be
implemented only when authorized by statute. GAO has ruled that an executive agency needs a clear grant of authority from Congress to implement
a collateral policy that limits those who are eligible for award of contracts.”
(citing authorities)). At the same time, a message to federal buyers that they
should allow “Buy USA” preferences to override published evaluation criteria
would undermine the rule of law in procurement, and could sour future U.S.
efforts to open foreign procurement markets, as foreign governments (and
purchasers) would be slow to forget perceived federal discrimination against
foreign vendors.
• Ignore Free Trade Obligations Under Reciprocal Defense
Procurement Agreements: Another strategy, related to the first, would
be to admonish Pentagon buyers to “Buy American” despite the United
States’ commitment under reciprocal defense procurement agreements not
to discriminate when buying defense materiel from the U.S. allies that have
entered into these special agreements. (In 2016, Japan, Estonia and Slovenia
joined the list of allies that have signed these memoranda of understanding between the U.S. Defense Department and its counterpart ministries
of defense. See, e.g., http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/cpic/ic/reciprocal_procurement_memoranda_of_understanding.html.)
A strategy of dismantling the reciprocal defense procurement agreements could raise a thicket of legal, political and national security issues,
however. While these reciprocal agreements (unlike the GPA and other free
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trade agreements) do not explicitly afford foreign vendors rights to protest,
and instead anticipate that nations will simply leave the agreements if
they suffer discrimination, see, e.g., 41 U.S.C. § 8304; Drew B. Miller, Is
It Time to Reform Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreements?, 39 Pub.
Cont. L.J. 93 (2009), affected foreign vendors from U.S. allies that suffered
discrimination might try to protest under the implementing rules set forth
in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, DFARS Subpart 225.4. Undercutting the reciprocal defense procurement agreements
also could hurt U.S. firms by shutting off foreign defense markets, which
generally are not opened by traditional trade agreements and which are
important for U.S. exporters. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Commerce, Int’l
Trade Admin., Defense Markets Report, at 9 (June 2016), http://trade.gov/
topmarkets/pdf/Defense_Top_Markets_Report.pdf). Moreover, reciprocal
defense procurement agreements are explicitly meant to nurture other
foreign policy and national security goals, such as interoperability and
mutual cooperation. Triggering a “trade war” in defense procurement thus
could prove deeply counterproductive, both economically and for purposes
of national security. Moreover, if the Trump administration hopes to make
U.S. defense spending more efficient while at the same time strengthening
U.S. national security, competition from allies’ vendors may prove essential. Thus, a strategy of abandoning the reciprocal defense agreements
(explicitly or implicitly), although relatively easy to implement, could raise
serious costs and risks.
• Including “Buy American” Preferences with New Infrastructure Spending: A more likely course would be to include “Buy American”
requirements in legislation authorizing new infrastructure spending -- which
was another important element of the Trump campaign. Infrastructure
funding legislation regularly includes “Buy American” requirements for procurement done by grantees and federal agencies using the new funds; the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (the “Recovery Act”), Pub. L. No.
5, 111th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Stat. 115 (2009), was a leading example of this
type of requirements.
The Recovery Act was also a good example of how a domestic preference
embedded in infrastructure spending could be reconciled with standing international trade agreements. While Section 1605 of the Recovery Act called for
the use of U.S. iron, steel and manufactured goods on projects funded by the
Act, Section 1605 also explicitly stated that this preference would be applied
“in a manner consistent with United States obligations under international
agreements.” See, e.g., Thomas D. Blanford, Note, Navigating the Recovery
Act’s Buy American Rule in State and Local Government Construction, 46
Proc. Law. 3 (Fall 2010).
An explicit reservation regarding international trade obligations is
important because, per the Trade Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2511, the
protections of international trade agreements are triggered only by explicit
direction of the President or his delegee, and that authority has been exercised only with regard to the Buy American Act and the U.S. Department
of Defense Balance of Payments Program. See Exec. Order 12260 (1979)
(authority delegated by President to U.S. Trade Representative); U.S. Trade
Representative, Government Procurement, https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/
government-procurement; FAR 25.402(a)(1) (“The President has delegated
this waiver authority to the U.S. Trade Representative. In acquisitions
covered by the WTO GPA, Free Trade Agreements, or the Israeli Trade
© 2017 Thomson Reuters
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Act, the U.S. Trade Representative has waived the Buy American statute
and other discriminatory provisions for eligible products. Offers of eligible
products receive equal consideration with domestic offers.”); Jean Heilman
Grier, Trade Agreements Act of 1979: Broad Authority, Narrow Application
(Apr. 21, 2014), http://trade.djaghe.com/?p=559.
Thus, unless legislation funding new infrastructure spending explicitly
reserves the United States’ obligations under international trade agreements,
an infrastructure bill that contains a “Buy American” limitation may trigger a broader trade battle. If an infrastructure bill launched by the Trump
administration is silent with regard to international obligations, and the
United States therefore does not follow its trade agreements in the resulting
spending, U.S. trading partners (such as the European Union) may argue that
the United States’ obligations to open its procurement markets were already
defined by agreement, and the U.S. statutory structure does not excuse those
obligations.
Moreover, not reserving those standing obligations in a new “Buy
American” provision would mean losing the leverage that the exclusion
could bring, with nations outside the scope of existing trade agreements.
Canada, for example, opened its provincial markets for the first time
specifically because of Section 1605 of the Recovery Act, as Canada was
willing to open its provincial procurement markets in order to access Recovery Act spending. See Christopher R. Yukins, Barriers to International
Trade in Procurement After the Economic Crisis -- Part II, Opening International Procurement Markets: Unfinished Business, 2011 Gov’t Contracts
Year in Review Briefs 4. Section 1605’s exclusion for existing agreements,
in other words, both preserved the United States’ relationships with its
trading partners and created new pressure on a nation that had not yet
fully embraced open procurement markets. This history suggests that a
Buy American preference in an infrastructure bill, combined with an exclusion for existing U.S. obligations, could offer benefits at relatively low
risk, though the higher costs and delays caused by the preference would
be a continuing concern.
• Expanding Buy American Act Price Preference: Another
strategy would be to expand the Buy American Act’s price preference. The
language of the Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. § 8302, does not stipulate
a price preference; instead, it states that, subject to certain exceptions,
only “unmanufactured articles, materials, and supplies that have been
mined or produced in the United States, and only manufactured articles,
materials, and supplies that have been manufactured in the United States
substantially all from articles, materials, or supplies mined, produced, or
manufactured in the United States, shall be acquired for public use unless the head of the department or independent establishment concerned
determines their acquisition to be inconsistent with the public interest
or their cost to be unreasonable.” (Emphasis added.) As implemented,
the Buy American Act preference therefore turns on the relative unreasonableness of a higher domestic price; if an offered domestic product is
unreasonably expensive, the agency is to buy the cheaper foreign product.
A general price preference (6 percent) was set by President Eisenhower
under Executive Order 10582, Prescribing Uniform Procedures for Certain
Determinations Under the Buy-American Act, 19 Fed. Reg. 8723 (1954),
and current regulations set a higher price preference (12 percent) when
the next-lowest-priced item is offered by a small business, FAR 25.105(b)
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(2). In the Defense Department, DFARS 225.105 imposes a preference of
50 percent on purchases of defense items. (That much higher preference at
the Defense Department is tempered by the reciprocal defense procurement
agreements, discussed above, which sweep away Buy American barriers
against foreign defense materiel from qualifying countries. See DFARS
252.225-7000 (Defense Department purchasers will “evaluate offers of
qualifying country end products without regard to the restrictions of the
Buy American statute”)).
Given the breadth of the Buy American Act’s language, the Trump
administration might, for example, seek to increase the price preferences
imposed under the Buy American Act regulations. Notably, the FAR already affords agencies the authority to set, by regulation, higher price
preferences under the Act. FAR 25.105(a); see Kate M. Manuel, The Buy
American Act -- Preferences for “Domestic” Supplies: In Brief, Cong. Res.
Serv. Rep. R43140, at 2 & n.13 (Apr. 26, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R43140.pdf.
While increasing the Buy American Act’s price preference might
gain political points, its economic benefits would be relatively unfocused
across the market, and it would raise costs in the procurement system,
see, e.g., Keith A. Hirschman, The Costs and Benefits of Maintaining the
Buy American Act 57-61 (Naval Postgraduate School 1998) (reviewing
literature on costs of Act’s price preference), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/
fulltext/u2/a350159.pdf -- something that candidate Trump said he did
not want to do. Moreover, a more expansive interpretation of the Buy
American Act generally would still apply only to smaller procurements,
up to the thresholds (typically $191,000 for supplies, and $7.3 million for
construction) above which trade agreements in effect override the Buy
American Act. See FAR 25.402(b) (thresholds); FAR 25.001(b) (“The restrictions in the Buy American statute are not applicable in acquisitions
subject to certain trade agreements.”). In practice, therefore, increasing
the price preference under the Buy American Act probably would create
more market opportunities for the small U.S. businesses. that tend to focus
on smaller, below-threshold procurements.
• Renegotiating Coverage Under Trade Agreements: It is unlikely that the Trump administration would decide to withdraw entirely
from the Government Procurement Agreement under Article XX of the
agreement, since leaving the GPA could close off valuable market access
abroad for U.S. exporters. Another option would be to try to reduce the scope
of the U.S. procurement market available under the GPA. Were the Trump
administration to reduce coverage, however, it would likely trigger protracted
negotiations under Article IX of the GPA, and, if those negotiations proved
unsuccessful, a challenge and potentially reciprocal reductions of access by
other nations could follow -- a slowly unfolding “trade war” in procurement,
in other words.
• Stalling Accessions to the GPA and Other Free Trade Agreements: A final option would be to slow the accession of China and other lowcost producers to the GPA, because by joining the GPA those countries would
gain broad access to the U.S. procurement market. While delaying Chinese
accession would not, in itself, reap significant political benefits for the Trump
administration, since China’s accession process has already been pending
for nearly a decade, see, e.g., Jean Heilman Grier, What are the prospects for
© 2017 Thomson Reuters
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concluding work on China’s GPA accession in 2015?, 2015 Pub. Proc. L. Rev.
221, the flip -- allowing China to join -- could be seen as a serious reversal
for the Trump administration.
Some of the options discussed above raise risks of challenge under current
trade agreements, either through a bid protest brought by a foreign vendor
or through a government-to-government dispute brought under the GPA.
Although the GPA explicitly provides for bid protests by vendors to enforce
the agreement’s requirements, potential vendor bid protests on those grounds
in the U.S. system were affected by a recent series of decisions before the
Government Accountability Office (GAO), Per Aarsleff a/s et al., Comp. Gen.
B-410782 (Feb. 18, 2015), and then the Court of Federal Claims, Per Aarsleff
A/S v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 603, 621 (2015), rev’d, 829 F.3d 1303 (Fed.
Cir. 2016), and on appeal before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. See, e.g., Ralph Nash, Jr., Preproposal Protests: When Are They Mandatory?, 30 Nash & Cibinic Rep. NL ¶ 43 (2016); Fed. Cir. Reverses COFC On
Eligibility Protest, 58 No. 27 GC ¶ 255 (2016).
The foreign vendors in the Per Aarsleff cases challenged the U.S. government’s failure to honor an international agreement which assured Denmark
that only Danish or Greenlandic firms would be awarded support contracts
at Thule Air Base, in Greenland. The GAO decision explicitly bypassed
the issues presented by the international agreement, focusing instead on
the terms of the solicitation, id. at 7 & n.8, and the Justice Department, in
defending the subsequent protest before the U.S. Court of Federal Claims,
121 Fed. Cl. at 621, and on the appeal before the Federal Circuit, see Brief
for Defendant-Appellant United States, Per Aarsleff v. United States, Fed.
Cir. No. 2015-5111, at 47 (Sept. 29, 2015), argued that because the Court of
Federal Claims is barred by 28 U.S.C. §1502 from hearing “claims” based on
“treaties,” the Court of Federal Claims is similarly barred from hearing bid
protests based upon international executive agreements. (The GPA and other
free trade agreements are considered executive agreements. See, e.g., Jane M.
Smith et al., Why Certain Trade Agreements Are Approved as CongressionalExecutive Agreements, Cong. Res. Serv. Rep. 97-896 (Apr. 15, 2013), https://fas.
org/sgp/crs/misc/97-896.pdf. The Court of Federal Claims did not disagree with
the government’s argument that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
to hear a bid protest grounded in an international agreement, 121 Fed. Cl.
at 622, though the court ultimately ruled on other grounds, and the Federal
Circuit did not address the issue.
As a result of the Per Aarsleff decisions, foreign vendors may conclude
that enforcing an international trade agreement -- fighting discrimination
in procurement -- through the standard U.S. bid protest process is simply
too difficult. If that happens, questions raised by the Trump administration’s
trade initiatives in procurement would need to be resolved under the GPA’s
government-to-government disputes process -- a much more cumbersome
process, and one that may further aggravate relations with the United States’
allies and trading partners.
V.

CONCLUSION: ASSESSING RISKS AND BENEFITS

Taking the various benefits and risks discussed above into account, it appears that the Trump administration faces an array of options, with differing
risks and perceived benefits:
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Trump Administration Options:
International Trade and Procurement

Increasing risk/difficulty

Ignore reciprocal
defense
agreements

Renegotiate
coverage under
trade
agreements

Publicly pressure
officials to “Buy
American”
Expand price
preference
under Buy
American Act
Stall China et al.
from joining
GPA

“Buy American”
requirement in
infrastructure
legislation

Increasing perceived benefits

As the chart reflects, the lowest risk and largest potential benefits probably
lie with including a “Buy American” provision in an infrastructure funding
bill. Other options, such as attempting to slow the accessions of some countries
(such as China) to the GPA, raise larger costs and risks, and some options,
such as dismantling the reciprocal defense procurement agreements, present
serious collateral risks to foreign policy and national security.
This assessment is not intended to endorse any one option, or indeed any
policy of aggressive protectionism. What the assessment is intended to do,
however, is to show that some options -- such as a “Buy American” provision
included in infrastructure funding legislation like the Recovery Act, with a
reservation for standing agreements -- may be easier to pursue, and may carry
less risk and cause less collateral damage to the other policy objectives that
drive open borders in procurement.
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